In a proxy re-encryption scheme, a semi-trusted proxy can transform a ciphertext under Alice's public key into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt. However, the proxy cannot access the plaintext. Due to its transformation property, proxy re-encryption can be used in many applications, such as encrypted email forwarding. In this paper, by using signature of knowledge and Fijisaki-Okamoto conversion, we propose a proxy re-encryption scheme without pairings, in which the proxy can only transform the ciphertext in one direction. The proposal is secure against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA) and collusion attack in the random oracle model based on Decisional Diffie-Hellman (DDH) assumption over Z * N 2 and integer factorization assumption, respectively. To the best of our knowledge, it is the first unidirectional PRE scheme with CCA security and collusion-resistance.
Introduction
In 1998, Blaze, Bleumer, and Strauss [6] proposed the concept of proxy re-encryption (PRE), where a semitrusted proxy can transform a ciphertext for Alice into another ciphertext that Bob can decrypt.
1 However, the proxy cannot get the plaintext. According to the direction of transformation, PRE schemes can be classified into two types, one is bidirectional, i.e., the proxy can transform from Alice to Bob and vice versa; the other is unidirectional, i.e., the proxy can only convert in one direction. Blaze et al. [6] also gave another method to classify PRE schemes: multi-use, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed from Alice to Bob to Charlie and so on; and single-use, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed only once.
Due to its transformation property, PRE can be used in many applications, including simplification of key distribution [6] , key escrow [21] , distributed file systems [2, 3] , security in publish/subscribe systems [23] , multicast [10] , secure certified email mailing lists [24, 22] , the DRM of Apple's iTunes [36] , interoperable architecture of DRM [34] , access control [35] , and privacy for public transportation [19] . Recently, particular, the gap Diffie-Hellman problem allows us to check whether log g A = log h B. In this paper, we use signature of knowledge [8, 1] to provide log g A = log h B, hence obtaining public verifiability for original ciphertexts. In fact, using the signature of knowledge to provide public verifiability is due to Shoup and Gennaro [33] . Furthermore, we use Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [14, 15] to provide the validity check of both original ciphertexts and re-encrypted ciphertexts for the decryptor (Alice or Bob).
Following the construction of the public key encryption scheme with double trapdoors in [7] , scheme U holds collusion-resistance. In particular, the factors of N are the long term secret key, and an exponent is the "weak" secret key, and revealing the exponent does not hurt the secrecy of the factors of N . To the best of our knowledge, scheme U is the first unidirectional PRE scheme holding CCA security and collusion-resistance simultaneously.
Finally, we extend scheme U to scheme U T , where the delegator can revoke the proxy's transformation ability. In particular, the proxy can only transform the ciphertext during a restricted time interval.
Organization
The remaining paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review the definitions related to our proposals. In what follows, we present scheme U and its security analysis, and scheme U T and its security analysis, in Section 3 and Section 4, respectively. In Section 5 we compare scheme U with previous unidirectional PRE schemes. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly review the definitions related to our proposals, some similar content can be found in [8, 1, 17, 9] .
Public Key Encryption
Definition 1 (Public Key Encryption (PKE)) A public key encryption scheme PKE is a triple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen, Enc, Dec):
• KeyGen(1 k ) → (pk, sk). On input the security parameter 1 k , the key generation algorithm KeyGen outputs a public key pk and a secret key sk.
• Enc(pk, m) → C. On input a public key pk and a message m in the message space, the encryption algorithm Enc outputs a ciphertext C.
• Dec(sk, C) → m. On input a secret key sk and a ciphertext C, the decryption algorithm Dec outputs a message m in the message space or ⊥.
Correctness.
The correctness property is that for any message m in the message space and any key pair (pk, sk) ← KeyGen(1 k ). Then the following condition must hold: Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m.
Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption
Definition 2 (Unidirectional PRE) A unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme UniPRE is a tuple of PPT algorithms (KeyGen, ReKeyGen, Enc, ReEnc, Dec):
• KeyGen, Enc, Dec: Identical to those in public key encryption.
• ReKeyGen(sk 1 , pk 2 ) → rk 1→2 . On input a secret key sk 1 and a public key pk 2 , the re-encryption key generation algorithm ReKeyGen outputs a unidirectional re-encryption key rk 1→2 .
• ReEnc(rk 1→2 , C 1 ) → C 2 . On input a re-encryption key rk 1→2 and a ciphertext C 1 , the re-encryption algorithm ReEnc outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext C 2 or ⊥.
Correctness.
A correct proxy re-encryption scheme should satisfy two requirements:
and
, and C is the ciphertext of message m for pk from algorithm Enc or algorithm ReEnc.
Chosen Ciphertext Security for Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption.
This security note is a modification of replayable chosen ciphertext security in [25] , where the corrupted public keys are not decided before start of the Uni-PRE-CCA game, and the adversary is allowed adaptive corruption of users 4 , and proxies between corrupted and uncorrupted users. But unlike [25] , we require that one well-formed ciphertext cannot be modified (but can be transformed) to be another well-formed ciphertext. In [25] , anyone can modify the transformed ciphertext, such that (
, where t is a random number from Z p . Note that this security model is only for single-use scheme.
Phase 1:
The adversary A issues queries q 1 , · · · , q n1 where query q i is one of:
• Public key generation oracle O pk : On input an index i, 5 the Challenger takes a security parameter k, and responds by running algorithm KeyGen(1 k ) to generate a key pair (pk i , sk i ), gives pk i to A and records (pk i , sk i ) in table T K .
• Secret key generation oracle O sk : On input pk by A, where pk is from O pk , the Challenger searches pk in table T K and returns sk.
• Re-encryption key generation oracle O rk : On input (pk, pk ′ ) by A, where pk, pk ′ are from O pk , the Challenger returns the re-encryption key rk pk→pk ′ = ReKeyGen(sk, pk ′ ), where sk is the secret key corresponding to pk.
• Re-encryption oracle O re : On input (pk, pk ′ , C) by A, where pk, pk ′ are from O pk , the re-encrypted ciphertext C ′ = ReEnc(ReKeyGen(sk, pk ′ ), C) is returned by the Challenger, where sk is the secret key corresponding to pk.
• Decryption oracle O dec : On input (pk, C), where pk is from O pk , the Challenger returns Dec(sk, C), where sk is the secret key corresponding to pk.
These queries may be asked adaptively, that is, each query q i may depend on the replies to q 1 , · · · , q i−1 .
Challenge:
Once the adversary A decides that Phase 1 is over, it outputs two equal length plaintexts m 0 , m 1 from the message space, and a public key pk * on which it wishes to be challenged. There are three constraints on the public key pk * , (i) it is from O pk ; (ii) it did not appear in any query to O sk in Phase 1; (iii) if (pk * , ⋆) did appear in any query to O rk , then ⋆ did not appear in any query to O sk . The Challenger picks a random bit b ∈ {0, 1} and sets C * = Enc(pk * , m b ). It sends C * as the challenge to A.
Phase 2:
The adversary A issues more queries q n1+1 , · · · , q n where query q i is one of:
• O pk : The Challenger responds as in Phase 1.
• O sk : On input pk by A, if the following requirements are all satisfied, the Challenger responds as in Phase 1; otherwise, the Challenger terminates the game.
-pk is from O pk ;
-pk ̸ = pk * ;
-(pk * , pk) is not a query to O rk before;
is not a query to O re before, where (pk ′ , C ′ ) is a derivative 6 of (pk * , C * ).
• O rk : On input (pk, pk ′ ) by A, if the following requirements are all satisfied, the Challenger responds as in Phase 1; otherwise, the Challenger terminates the game.
-pk, pk ′ are from O pk ;
-if pk = pk * , then pk ′ is not a query to O sk .
• O re : On input (pk, pk ′ , C) by A, if the following requirements are all satisfied, the Challenger responds as in Phase 1; otherwise, the Challenger terminates the game.
-if (pk, C) is a derivative of (pk * , C * ), then pk ′ is not a query to O sk .
• O dec : On input (pk, C), if the following requirements are all satisfied, the Challenger responds as in Phase 1; otherwise, the Challenger terminates the game.
-(pk, C) is not a derivative of (pk * , C * ).
These queries may be also asked adaptively.
Guess: Finally, the adversary A outputs a guess b ′ ∈ {0, 1} and wins the game if b = b ′ .
We refer to such an adversary A as a Uni-PRE-CCA adversary. We define adversary A's advantage in attacking UniPRE as the following function of the security parameter k: [26] .
Besides CCA security, there is another security notion, collusion resistance, for unidirectional PRE schemes.
Definition 4 (Uni-PRE-CR security) 8 We say that a unidirectional proxy re-encryption scheme UniPRE is collusion resistant if for any polynomial bounded adversary A, the following probability is negligible:
Due to its similarity with that of unidirectional PRE schemes, we put the definitions of unidirectional PRE schemes with temporary delegation in the Appendix.
Signature of Knowledge
In our proposal, we apply the following non-interactive zero-knowledge proof of knowledge, named signature of knowledge of equality of two discrete logarithms [8, 1, 32] . The party in possession of the secret x is able to compute the signature, provided that x = log g y 1 = log h y 2 , by choosing a random t ∈ {0, · · · , 2 We denote SoK.Gen(y 1 , y 2 , g, h, m) as the generation of the proof.
Complexity Assumption
The security of our proposal is based on the Decisional Diffie-Hellman assumption (DDH) over Z * N 2 . DDH Problem. The DDH problem is as follows: Given ⟨g, g a , g b ⟩ for some a, b ∈ ord(G) and T ∈ G, decide whether T = g ab , where G is a cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo N 2 (N is a safe-prime modulus), g is a random number of G.
where the probability is over the random choices of a, b in ord(G), the random choices of g, T in G, and the random bits of A.
Definition 6 (DDH Assumption) We say that the ε-DDH assumption holds if no PPT algorithm has advantage at least ε in solving the DDH problem.
Note that the DDH problem over Z * N 2 is easy if the factors of N is known [7] .
The Public Key Encryption with Double Trapdoors
The basic public key encryption of our proposal is the public key encryption with double trapdoors in [7] , named BCP03.
The following description is from [7] . Let N = pq be a safe prime modulus, such that p = 2p ′ + 1, q = 2q ′ + 1, and p, p ′ , q, q ′ are primes. Assume G is the cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo N 2 , then we have the order of G is N p ′ q ′ .
•
The public key is (N, g, h), and the secret key is a.
• Enc(pk, m) → C. On input a public key pk and a message m ∈ Z N , the ciphertext (A, B) is computed as
where r is a random number from Z N 2 .
• Dec(sk, C) → m. There are two methods to decrypt.
-Knowing a, one can compute m by
Note the values of a mod N and r mod N can be computed when given h = g a mod N 2 , A = g r mod N 2 , and p ′ , q ′ , by the method in [27] (Theorem 1 in [27] ).
New Unidirectional Proxy Re-Encryption Scheme without Pairings
The proposed unidirectional scheme U is based on the CPA secure and collusion resistant unidirectional PRE scheme in [2, 3] (the first attempt scheme in [2, 3] ), and with the signature of knowledge [8, 1] and Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [14, 15] . The basic public key encryption is scheme BCP03. The intuition in scheme U is as follows. Firstly, since there are two trapdoors (a and the factorization of the modulus) in scheme BCP03, we can use the key sharing technique in [17] to share a. In particular, let a = r 1 +r 2 , and sent the proxy r 1 and the ciphertext of r 2 under the delegatee's public key. Knowing a cannot hurt the secrecy of the factorization of the modulus, hence, collusion-resistance obtained. Secondly, scheme BCP03 is CPA-secure, hence, we use Fijisaki-Okamoto conversion to make scheme BCP03 be CCA-secure. Thirdly, we use the signature of knowledge to make the original ciphertext be publicly verifiable.
Scheme U with Single-Use
Scheme U contains three cryptographic hash functions for all users:
k2 , where k 1 and k 2 are the security parameter, n is the bit-length of messages to be encrypted. The details are as follows.
KeyGen: Choose a safe-prime modulus N = pq, three random numbers α ∈ Z *
The public key is pk = (H(·), N, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ), the "weak" secret key is wsk = (a, b), and the long term secret key is sk = (p, q, p ′ , q ′ ).
ReKeyGen: On input a public key
, a "weak" secret key wsk X = a X , and a long term secret key
, it outputs the unidirectional re-encryption key rk X→Y = (rk (1) X→Y , rk (2) X→Y ), where rk (1) X→Y = (Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ), and computed as follows:
k1 .
• Compute rk
Enc: On input a public key pk = (H(·), N, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ) and a message m ∈ {0, 1} n , the encryptor does the following performances:
• Choose a random number σ ∈ Z N .
, where the underlying hash function is H 3 .
• Output the ciphertext K = (A, B, C, D, c, s).
ReEnc: On input a re-encryption key rk X→Y = (rk
If not hold, output ⊥ and terminate; otherwise, re-encrypt the ciphertext to be under key pk Y as:
• Output the new ciphertext (A, A ′ , B, C, rk
B, C,Ȧ,Ḃ,Ċ).
Dec: On input a secret key and any ciphertext K,
, if not, output ⊥ and terminate; otherwise,
• if the input secret key is the "weak" secret key a,
• if the secret key is the long term secret key (p, q, p
, where w 1 is computed as that in scheme BCP03, and π is the inverse of 2p
holds, output m; otherwise, output ⊥ and terminate.
In this case, the decryptor should know the delegator's (Alice's) public key (
• If the input secret key is the "weak" secret key b, computeσ =Ḃ • If the input secret key is the long term secret key (p, q, p
both hold, then output m; otherwise, output ⊥ and terminate.
Note that (H(·), N, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ) is the public key of the decryptor. (1), the base is g 1 , while in equation (2) Note that the above attack is also allowed in the security model in [17, 13] , since they only disallow the adversary to corrupt the proxy between the target user and the uncorrupted user. The unidirectional schemes in [17, 13] suffer from the above attack. To resist the above attack, we can use the same method in scheme U, in particular, every user has two public/secret key pairs, one is for decrypting ciphertexts of messages, and the other is for decrypting the partial re-encryption key.
Remark 2 The values ofḂ and B are computed differently, in particular, in equation
Correctness. The correctness property is easily obtained by the correctness of scheme BCP03 [7] and Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion [14, 15] . Proof. We show that if there exists an algorithm A that can break U with probability ϵ in time t, then there is another algorithm B that uses A to solve DDH problem over Z * N 2 , i.e., on DDH input (N, g, 
Phase 1:
O pk : On input an index i, B decides whether pk i is the attacked public key pk * .
• If yes,
• Otherwise, B runs KeyGen to get the public key (H(·), N, g 0 , g 1 , g 2 ) 
X→Y ∈ Z N 2 ,σ ∈ Z N , and does
-Set rk
Because of the security property of scheme BCP03 with Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion, we have that only if we can successfully respond the decryption oracle queried with the re-encrypted ciphertexts re-encrypted by the above re-encryption keys, this step is the undistinguishable from the real execution from the viewpoint of A.
• If pk X is the guessed attacked public key, and pk Y is in 
Check in S 2 if there exists a (σ
8. Set rk • If pk X is not the guessed attacked public key, then sk X is known to B, who responds A with Dec(sk X , K).
• If pk X is the guessed attacked public key and K = (A, B, C, D, c, s) 
If none exists or more than one exist, then output ⊥ and terminate; otherwise, output m i .
• If pk X is the guessed attacked public key and 
and β j ⊕ m i =Ċ. If none exists or more than one exist, then output ⊥ and terminate.
Compute
is the corresponding delegator's public key; otherwise, output ⊥ and terminate. 
If it does exist, B checks

Check in S 2 if there exists a (σ
Challenge: At some point, A outputs a challenge tuple (pk * , m 0 , m 1 ). If pk * is not the public key B guessed in oracle O pk , B reports failure and aborts. Otherwise, B responds choosing random d ∈ {0, 1}, σ ∈ Z N and setting:
And then B chooses two random numbers c Firstly, we analyze the probability of B do not abort due to the failure events, which are as follows.
1. B did not guess the right attacked public key.
The record (A
Suppose A makes a total of q pk queries to public key generation oracle, q rk queries to re-encryption key generation orale, q de queries to decryption orale, q H queries to H hash function oracle, q H1 queries to H 1 hash function oracle, q H2 queries to H 2 hash function oracle, and q H3 queries to H 3 hash function oracle.
The probabilities that B does not abort due to the first failure event and the second failure event are 1/q pk and 1 − (q H3 + 1)/2 k2 , respectively. Therefore, the probability that B does not abort due to the failure events during the simulation is (1 − (q H3 + 1)/2 k2 )/q pk . Secondly, oracles O re and O dec are indistinguishable from the corresponding real executions with probabilities at least
respectively, where q HX is the amount of queries to the same kind of oracle O H , N mX is the largest number among users' public key N 's, |Z NmX | is the size of Z NmX , and q 2 = max{
2 n }. Finally, in the re-encryption oracle, we assume that the signature of knowledge is secure, hence, we should minus the probability of breaking the signature of knowledge ξ.
As a result, B's advantage is at least
and its running time is at most
where t e is the time of computing one exponentiation in a cyclic group of quadratic residues modulo, and we only consider the exponentiation computation.
Note that if we modifies B as computed by
we can get a new PRE scheme proven secure against chosen ciphertext based on CDH assumption over Z * N 2 and secure signature of knowledge. 9 The proof is almost the same as that of Theorem 1, but the probability of solving CDH assumption will be 1/q H ′ of that of solving DDH assumption, where q H ′ is the number of queries to oracle H ′ .
Theorem 2 (Uni-PRE-CR security)
In the random oracle, if N is hard to factor, then scheme U is collusion resistant.
Proof. One can easily show that an algorithm for against scheme U's collusion resistance, i.e., from an algorithm that it is given (N, g 0 ,
, and q = 2q ′ + 1, we can easily get another algorithm for factoring N.
Scheme U T with Temporary Delegation
This section describes scheme U T , a variant of scheme U, supporting temporary delegation. Like the temporary unidirectional PRE schemes in [2, 3, 25] , the proxy is only allowed to transform ciphertexts from the delegator to the delegatee during a limited time period. The point of modifying scheme U to scheme U T is to make different g 1 's for every time period.
Scheme U T also contains three cryptographic hash functions for all users:
* → {0, 1} n , and H 3 (·) : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k2 , where k 1 and k 2 are the security parameter, n is the bit-length of messages to be encrypted. The details are as follows.
KeyGen: Choose a safe-prime modulus N = pq, T + 2 random numbers α ∈ Z *
primes, T is the number of time intervals, and H(·)
, and the long-term secret key is sk = (p, q, p ′ , q ′ ).
, a "weak" secret key a X,j for time period j ∈ {1, · · · , T X }, and a secret key
, it outputs the unidirectional reencryption key rk X→Y,j = (rk (1) X→Y,j , rk (2) X→Y,j ) for the j-th time period, which is generated as follows.
• Choose two random numbersσ j ∈ Z N ,β j ∈ {0, 1} k1 .
Enc: On input a public key pk = (H(·), N, g 0 , g
1 , g 2 ), a time period j ∈ {1, · · · , T } and a message m ∈ {0, 1} n , the encryptor does the following performances:
• Choose a random number σ j ∈ Z N .
• Compute r j = H(σ j ||m),
• Run (c j ,
• Output the ciphertext
ReEnc: On input a re-encryption key rk X→Y,j = (rk
X→Y,j ) and a ciphertext
X1 , g X2 ), where j ∈ {1, · · · , T X }, the proxy checks
• Output the new ciphertext
Dec: On input a secret key and any ciphertext K j for the j-th time period, where j ∈ {1, · · · , T }, the decryptor parses
• if the input secret key is the "weak" secret key a j , compute
H(σj ||m) ·(1+σ j ·N ) mod N 2 holds, output m; otherwise, output ⊥ and terminate.
• If the input secret key is the "weak" secret key b,
• If the input secret key is the long term secret key (p, q, p
Note that (H(·), N, g 0 , g
1 ), g 2 ) is the public key of the decryptor. Correctness. The correctness property is easily obtained by the same method for scheme U.
Theorem 3 (Uni-PRETD-CCA Security) In the random oracle model, scheme U T is CCA-secure under the assumptions that DDH problem over Z * N 2 is hard, and that the signature of knowledge is secure. Proof. In this proof, B does not only guess which public key is the attacked public key, but also guess which time period is the attacked time period. We set N as the safe-prime modulus of the target public key, g 0 = g, and set g u as the public parameters of the attacked time period. The rest of the simulation can be proceeded by the same method in the proof of Theorem 1.
The probability of this proof is 1/q T of that in the proof of Theorem 1, where q T is the amount of time periods of the attacked time period.
Theorem 4 (Uni-PRETD-CR security)
In the random oracle, if N is hard to factor, then scheme U T is collusion resistant.
Proof. It is easy to get this proof, since we can know "weak" secret key which can be used to respond all kinds of queries. Once the adversary outputs the long-term secret key (p, q, p ′ , q ′ ), we get the factors of N.
Comparison
In this section, we compare scheme U with the previous CCA-secure unidirectional PRE schemes. Since as mentioned above, the unidirectional PRE schemes in [21, 17, 11, 13] are not CCA-secure, we only compare scheme U with the scheme in [25] (named LV08).
In Table 1 , we denote t p , t eb , t eN , t s , and t v as the computational cost of a bilinear pairings, an exponentiation over a bilinear group, an exponentiation over Z * N 2 (N is a safe-prime modulus), a one-time signature and verification, respectively. G e and G T are the bilinear groups used in scheme LV08. N X and N Y are the safe-prime modulus corresponding to the delegator and the delegatee, respectively. svk and σ are the one-time signature's public key and signature. Note that we only consider the case of using weak secret key to decrypt in Dec algorithm of scheme U.
From Table 1 , we can see that scheme LV08 is a little bit more efficient than scheme U. In order to guarantee that N is hard to factor, N should be 1024-bit at least, which makes scheme U need more time for an exponentiation and more storage for a ciphertext. However, we emphasize that scheme U is CCAsecure and based on the well-studied DDH assumption, while scheme LV08 is RCCA-secure and based on the less-studied 3-quotient decision Bilinear Diffie-Hellman (3-QDBDH) assumption.
Conclusions
In this paper, by using signature of knowledge and Fijisaki-Okamoto conversion, we proposed the first CCAsecure and collusion resistant unidirectional PRE scheme without pairings, which solves a problem proposed in [9, 25] .
There are still many open problems to be solved, such as designing more efficient CCA-secure, collusion resistant unidirectional PRE schemes without pairings, and CCA-secure multi-use unidirectional PRE schemes [9, 25] . 
